Pinui-Binui in Israel: Not TAMA 38, Not an 80% Vote

Pinui-binui is not TAMA 38 and not an 80 percent vote. The 2006 law’s qualified majority is two-thirds of the cluster, three-fifths of each building, and more than half the common property. A pending listing is not that majority. A finished replacement unit is a new-build. We invent no citywide share.

A 2006 statute stack, not a seismic leftover

English pages still mash pinui-binui (evacuate and rebuild) (פינוי-בינוי) into TAMA 38 and quote an 80% owner vote as if it were still the cell. Pinui-binui is a 2006 statute stack, not TAMA 38 and not an 80% vote. The Act-text qualified majority is two-thirds of the apartments in the cluster, three-fifths of the apartments in each condominium, and more than half the common property in each of those condominiums. A listing that says pending is not that majority, not a court order, and not title. The Act is Pinui and Binui (Encouragement of Pinui and Binui Ventures) Law, 5766-2006 (Sefer HaChukim 5766, 171), the current title of the 2006 compensation statute. A declared pinui-binui complex (מתחם פינוי ובינוי) is declared under Governmental Authority for Urban Renewal Law, 5776-2016 s.14. A cluster (one condominium or several that must be vacated to build the new house) (מקבץ) is a condominium, or a cluster of condominiums, that must be vacated in order to erect a new building in a pinui-binui complex under a detailed plan. This law’s condominium (this law: at least four apartments) (בית משותף) has at least 4 apartments. Who may hold title is can foreigners buy. Buying is still not a visa.

The qualified majority is two-thirds plus three-fifths, not 80%

Section 1 defines qualified majority of apartment owners (רוב מיוחס). Owners in the cluster who own at least two-thirds of all apartments in the cluster. They also own at least three-fifths of the apartments in each condominium in that cluster. For a condominium of four or five apartments only: they own at least three of those apartments, and the condominium has more than two owners. More than half of the common property in each condominium in that cluster is attached to their apartments. The Act-text cell is two-thirds of the cluster plus three-fifths per building plus more than half the common property. It is not an 80% leftover. A separate, lower bar exists only for asking a pinui-binui appraiser whether the deal is economically viable: Owners in the cluster who own more than two-fifths of the apartments in each condominium in that cluster, and more than two-fifths of the common property in each of those condominiums is attached to their apartments. That viability majority is not the majority that opens s. 2’s court remedies.

A first signature has a meeting, a document, and cancel clocks

A pinui-binui (evacuate and rebuild) deal is not a handshake. A contract between a developer and an apartment owner in a condominium under which the owner undertakes to sell some or all of their rights so the condominium can be demolished and a new condominium built in its place under a pinui-and-binui plan, with a power of attorney to the developer or the developer's lawyer, including: principles for each owner's consideration; outer dates for a detailed plan, a building permit, and delivery of the new apartment; who will do the building work or the conditions for choosing them; and the developer's undertaking to give guarantees for those obligations. The first deal is a pinui-binui deal signed by one owner in a condominium that was not preceded by a pinui-binui deal between that same developer and another owner in the same condominium. Section 1א then puts process in front of that signature. Before signing a first pinui-binui deal the developer shall convene the condominium's owners, or take part in such a meeting, introduce themselves, and present the type of deal proposed. No later than two weeks before the first pinui-binui deal is signed, the developer shall give every owner in the condominium a principal-offer document setting out, among other things, the principles for the consideration offered, the securities offered to the owners, and details of the developer's professional experience. If those steps were skipped, s.1ג lets a majority of owners cancel so long as fewer than 40% have signed. If a pinui-binui deal was signed before the owners' meeting was held or before the principal-offer document was delivered, a majority of the owners in the condominium may decide to cancel the deals so long as 40% of the owners in the condominium have not yet signed such deals. Notice goes to the developer in writing; owners who had already contracted are not treated as having breached.

Section 1ד is the later clock. A majority of owners in the condominium, including someone who is not a party, may resolve in a general meeting that owners who contracted with a developer may cancel if the developer has not contracted with at least half of the owners within two years of the first deal, or with at least three-fifths within four years of the first deal. Or if the developer has not submitted a detailed plan to the competent planning institution within four years and six months of the first deal — except a condominium in a complex declared under s.14(a)(1) of the Governmental Authority for Urban Renewal Law. In a pinui-binui complex or a complex with preliminary approval under that s.14 that has at least 120 units, those periods are extended by one year. Those are cancel-enabling votes. They are not a published days-to-keys figure. Keys versus title stay on handover versus Tabu. The written undertaking that can bind before Tabu is zichron devarim. A remote close still needs a power of attorney.

A holdout is a court cell, not a listing slogan

If a qualified majority of owners in the cluster have agreed to conclude a pinui-binui deal, and the court finds that an owner in that cluster unreasonably refuses to transfer their rights for the deal or conditions consent on unreasonable terms (a refusing apartment owner), the court may do one of the following. The two published remedies: Hold the refusing owner liable in tort toward the other agreeing owners in that cluster for the damage caused to them by the deal not being carried out. Or approve carrying out the deal and appoint a lawyer or accountant who is not an owner in the cluster, authorised under the court's directions to contract the deal in the name of the refusing owner. Refusal is not treated as unreasonable, among other things, where the pinui-binui deal is not economically viable. A pinui-binui appraiser's determination that the deal is economically viable is a presumption that it is viable. We publish no typical award and no typical months-to-order. Dual representation and reserved acts sit on the lawyer page. The title-and-planning file is due diligence. The register extract is still Tabu, not the ad.

A finished replacement unit is a new-build file

A delivered replacement dwelling (דירת תמורה) is the apartment the owner is meant to receive after demolition. For the stacks that bind a defined builder-seller it is a new-build: the official 18% VAT cell sits inside a dealer sticker unless VAT Law s.31a zero-rates a listed replacement-unit cell up to a value ceiling we do not republish as a Tel Aviv average. The 1974 7% unsecured take and the 1973 late-delivery / defect clocks sit on new-build vs second-hand. A typical private resale of the home someone already lives in is none of those cells.

The municipal betterment levy is a different statute. From May 1, 2022 the rate on residential land is 25% of the betterment where it arises from approval of a pinui-binui plan (Planning and Building Law Third Schedule s.3A). The default betterment cell is still 50%. A local authority may zone its area at one half, one quarter, or none. Full cells live on capital gains and betterment. We will not pretend the July 2026 citywide median asking ₪4,850,000 (≈ $1,310,811 / €1,212,500 / £1,021,053; n = 1,037 tracked active listings) is a pinui-binui sticker. Implied size — that median divided by apartment-scale ₪/sqm (n = 987) — is 88 sqm (950 sqft). The asking panel is not a renewal census.

The modern package is amenity clustering, not a pinui premium

A finished rebuild often delivers a safe room, a lift, and parking together. That is why we can join the amenity-flagged panel — and why we must not call the gap a pinui-binui premium. In July 2026 the citywide modern package (mamad + elevator + parking) asked 17.9% more ₪/sqm than listings with none of the three: ₪58,943/sqm (n = 377) versus ₪50,000/sqm (n = 252). The panel behind those flags is 1,028 amenity-flagged tracked listings. Citywide mamad share on that panel is 48.4%. City Center, where both arms clear the gate, shows 35.8% (n all three = 34; n none = 58). The metric is an association in asking prices across different apartments. It is not a valuation and not “pinui-binui adds 17.9%.” Full controls live on apartment feature premiums.

What we still will not invent

Six cells stay unpublished. A citywide pinui-binui share of the asking panel. An 80% majority leftover — The Act-text cell is two-thirds of the cluster plus three-fifths per building plus more than half the common property. It is not an 80% leftover. A typical replacement-unit size or a days-to-keys statute. A typical holdout award under s. 2. The VAT s.31a value ceiling as a Tel Aviv average. That the modern-package gap is a pinui-binui premium — it is amenity clustering in asking ₪/sqm. TAMA 38/1 versus 38/2 remains on TAMA 38 for buyers. VAT Law s.31b is the strengthening-plan sibling, temporary through December 31, 2033.

Frequently asked questions

Where this fits

This page is the pinui-binui citation target. The seismic sibling is TAMA 38 for buyers. A finished unit is new-build vs second-hand and VAT on a new-build. The 25% pinui-binui betterment cell is capital gains. The amenity join is feature premiums. Possession versus title is handover versus Tabu. The cluster map is the foreign-buyer guide. Hebrew terms are in the glossary. Live asking figures sit on Tel Aviv property prices. Return to the buying-guide hub.